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The ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme (EAPP) adds the purchase
programme for public sector securities to the existing private sector asset
purchase programmes to address the risks of a too prolonged period of low
inflation. It now consists of a covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), asset-
backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and public sector purchase
programme (PSPP).
However, as the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy remains
characterized by long, variable and uncertain time lags, the impact of asset
purchases on the real economy continues to be a matter of discussion as
confirmed by the slow recovery in bank lending. Some economists even argue
that the most effective transmission channel of unconventional monetary policy is
the exchange rate. Against this backdrop, the note assesses the effectiveness of
the ECB programme of asset purchases one year after its first implementation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Albeit estimating the macroeconomic effects of ECB’s quantitative easing (QE) is clearly
challenging given that only one year has passed since its first implementation, policies to
reduce pressure on government bond yields have generally been effective.  However, the
liquidity in the credit markets has so far not returned evenly, forcing the ECB to flood the
financial system with fresh liquidity in order to sustain the yet fragile euro area recovery.
With these limitations in mind, this note attempts to assess the effectiveness of the ECB
programme of asset purchases one year after its first implementation. We find that:
 (Preliminary) empirical evidence is supportive of the latest ECB’s expanded
asset purchase programme (EAPP) in that it succeeded in lowering bond
yields and pushing the investors out from the sovereign debt market.
 Talking about the EAPP extension in the direction of buying investment-grade
euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporates, previous private
asset purchases have generally shown positive results, though mostly in the
US. This, however, happened in an environment when the spread over US
Treasuries was unusually high. While Portugal’s and Greece’s 2 and 10 year
spreads are on the rise, it is not the case for the whole euro area at the
moment.
 All in all, and based on the previous (non-euro area) evidence available, the
medium to long-term effects of European QE may depend on the quality of
market signalling by the ECB and the extent to which markets will react to it
going forward. The immediate market reaction to the extension of assets
purchases has been a lot more liquidity into the fixed income segment.
However, it is not clear whether this rapid influx of liquidity is improving the
market functioning, or it is simply used to engage in speculative short-term
gains.
 Inflation is still subdued. Only the 5-year ahead inflation expectation comes
somewhere close to (even if still significantly under) the 2 percent target.
What is not clear is whether those expectations have priced in a possibility of
the ECB continuing the EAPP 5 years ahead. If so, should the ECB decide to
tamper off sooner, there might be further downward pressure for medium-
term expectation. Evidence on inflation expectations may be difficult to
evaluate, given the counteracting effects of oil prices and weak demand from
emerging market economies at the same time. Consistent with the ECB’s
inflation forecasts’ figures, however, the Survey of Professional Forecasters
last reported that the risks to the baseline inflation outlook are perceived as
relatively on the downside for 2017 and 2018, with these downside risks
stemming indeed primarily from external factors.
 The EUR-USD has been depreciating and has - since then - remained stable,
fluctuating at around 1.1 since March last year. The ECB clearly wishes for
the euro exchange rate to continue to weaken as it continues with the EAPP,
in the hope of spurring growth via external demand. However, its success will
crucially depend on several factors, including trade. While the EUR has
weakened with respect to several other currencies, since ECB engaged in
EAPP, the EUR has consistently appreciated with respect to the basket of its
trade-weighted currencies. The index is currently at the same point as it was
in early 2015, just before the QE.
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 The euro area economy expanded 0.5 percent on quarter-to-quarter in the
first three months of 2016, lower than a preliminary estimate of 0.6 percent.
This still represents the fastest growth rate in a year as large economies such
as Germany, France and Italy accelerated while Greece and Latvia
contracted.
 While bank lending is picking up in the euro area, ECB’s programme seems to
have had so far limited impact on the lending-decisions. If anything, it is
having an impact on the terms and conditions of loans, not the quantity of
credit. However, significant regional disparities have been observed in
lending. In particular, mainly banks from the core seem to be (re)gaining
confidence about national (sovereign and credit) conditions.
 Even if the supply shortage is not an imminent problem for the ECB, it might
become a problem at a later date when the ECB will try to execute further
purchases and the universe of ‘acceptable’ bonds will shrink, particularly in
the core. At the same time, on the demand side, more than 53 percent of
total foreseen purchases of bonds under the EAPP have been executed, but
there is at least one year to go. Hence the logistics of accessing bonds for
ECB may become a supply, as well as a demand problem, if the
characteristics of the Program do not change.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme (EAPP) adds the purchase programme for
public sector securities to the existing private sector asset purchase programmes to
address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation. It now consists of a covered
bond purchase programme (CBPP3), asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP)
and public sector purchase programme (PSPP). According to the latest ECB’s Governing
Council release, monthly purchases in public and private sector securities will amount to
€80 billion (updating the previous figure of €60 billion from March 2015 until March 2016).
They are intended to be carried out until the end of March 2017 and in any case until the
Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is consistent
with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
Large asset purchases have a more direct impact on bank’s balance sheet and the
availability of credit for firms and households. The ultimate goal is the same, namely to
stimulate spending, but quantitative measures changing the size/composition of the
balance sheet remain the only effective tools to achieve further monetary policy
accommodation, when the lower bound for policy interest rates is reached.
Nevertheless, impact of asset purchases on the real economy continues to be a matter of
discussion as confirmed by the mixed macroeconomic results and the slow recovery in bank
lending. Some economists even argue that the most effective transmission channel of
unconventional monetary policy is the exchange rate, i.e. via the depreciation of the euro.
Against this backdrop, we assess the (macroeconomic and financial) impacts of ECB’s QE
one year since it was first implemented. In particular, we assess the continuing impact it
has on inflation (expectations), exchange rate, bank lending, corporate credit, bond yields,
and ultimately, the growth prospects for the euro area.
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2. QE AT WORK
Albeit estimating the macroeconomic effects of European quantitative easing is clearly
challenging given that only one year has passed since its first implementation, policies to
reduce pressure on government bond yields have generally been effective. However, the
liquidity in the credit markets has so far not returned, forcing the ECB to flood the financial
system with fresh liquidity in order to sustain the yet fragile euro area recovery.
The aim of the QE is, as expressed by ECB President Mario Draghi, to do “whatever it
takes” to bring the core consumer-price-index (CPI) back to the 2%-target. However, by
November 2015, it became clear that the core CPI was still far below the ECB’s threshold.
In fact, since the start of QE inflation has had hard time to even cross 1% (see Macchiarelli
and Gerba, 2016). In light of this, and following the ECB’s Governing Council meeting of 3
December 2015, it was announced that the EAPP would be first extended in scope, time,
and possibly even size: in particular, the list of eligible collateral would be extended to
include securities issued by regional and local governments, and the programme would be
extended by at least 6 months until March 2017. At the same time, the deposit rate was
cut by 10 b.p., down to -0.30%. A second extension in scope (but not in duration) came
with the last ECB’s Governing Council Decision of 10 March 2016, one year since the start
of the Program, with the decision to cut the interest rate on the deposit facility at a
historical low, by 10 basis points, down to -0.40%, and to extend the monthly purchases
under the asset purchase programme to €80 billion starting in April, with corporate bonds
being the latest assets to be added to a growing list of securities the ECB will be open to
buy.
This latest extension is primarily targeted at investment-grade type of corporate bonds.
While the exact details of these purchases are still unclear, the start date of their purchases
has been set to Wednesday 8 July 2016. Moreover, it is highly probable that most of the
bonds will come from the primary market (Suter, 2016), i.e. where the highest liquidity is
concentrated. Nevertheless, until a significant amount of corporate bond purchases have
been executed, I will be difficult know their exact origin and status.
This additional extension is intended to last until the end of March 2017 and in any case
until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is
consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium
term. As demonstrated by this further extension, the ECB is hoping that the program does
not become obsolete, at least in the near term, and that further liquidity injection will help
market conditions normalize.
In conjunction with an extension of the Program, a new series of four targeted longer-term
refinancing operations (TLTRO II), each with a maturity of four years, has been launched,
with the start date set in June 2016. As highlighted previously, another targeted long-term
funding operation for banks was to be indeed expected (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016).
Looking at the history of the long term refinancing operations, in the euro area, the
previous three-year full-allotment LTROs avoided massive bank deleveraging and an
ensuing contraction in credits, following frozen interbank markets (Ciccarelli et al., 2013;
Paries et al., 2013). They also increased carry-trade opportunities for banks to get cheap
liquidity and invest into government bonds over the same maturity, resulting into further
buy-back of sovereign bonds. Banks either deposited the cheap central bank funding at the
ECB, or purchased higher yielding government bonds. Thereby, the LTROs in effect
supported liquidity, ensured stable medium to long-term financing of banks, and
temporarily supported further distressed government bond markets (Claeys, 2014).
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Figure 1: The ECB’s deposit facility rate since the start of the EAPP
Source: ECB data
With the EAPP, however, the story is completely different (see Gerba and Macchiarelli,
2016). Cutting the ECB deposit rate below -0.2 (-0.4 as of April 2016 – Cf. Figure 1) indeed
makes banks want to reduce their exposure to the ECB to the minimum. Hence, instead of
increasing their lending to households and businesses, banks would likely respond by
moving money to non-euro zone central banks (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016). To avoid
such scenario and get banks to lend more, the ECB will therefore need to wave “a lending
carrot” (e.g. TLTRO) discouraging banks from simply putting their money into safe assets
like overseas sovereign bonds. In addition, the indirect stimulus to government bond
markets coming from carry trade is very limited at the moment, given that by mid-
November 2015 already, about a third of the debt issues by euro area governments had
negative yields. For ‘safe’ countries, almost the entire maturity spectrum of bonds trades at
negative yields. If we take the shorter-end spectrum of debt (for instance 2-years), already
by November 2015, almost all European debt was trading at negative yields (this will be
discussed in greater detail in Section 3).
2.1. Direct evidence on the effects of bond purchases
A recent ECB paper by Altavilla, Carboni and Motto (2015), evaluating the impact of the
most recent EAPP on asset prices, reports the impact of the latter to be “sizeable”, despite
an environment of relatively low financial distress (indeed, the program came at a time
when the pressure on sovereign bond yields was plummeting). The authors attribute the
result to the interplay of the EAPP with the asset composition of the programme, via
“portfolio rebalancing” (scarcity and duration; see also Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015) as
well credit channel effects, whereby changes in the maturity composition of nominal
government debt affected other – non-targeted – asset prices.
This complements the empirical evidence for the other purchasing programs previously
implemented by the ECB, and having different scope. Under the SMP, initiated in May 2010,
the ECB bought Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish government bonds. At the
time, the ECB announced that the bonds would be held to maturity and that the purchases
were entirely sterilised; hence “not-inflationary”. The intervention was justified in light of
the severe tensions in certain market segments that were hampering the transmission of
the ECB’s monetary policy. Ghysels et al. (2012) have tried to assess the impact of SMP
and conclude that it had a positive but short-lived effect on market functioning by reducing
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liquidity premia and reducing the level as well as the volatility of government bond yields.
Likewise, while no transaction materialized, the announcement of OMT (outright monetary
transactions) significantly decreased bond yields in euro area countries under market stress
(see Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza, 2014), thus strengthening bank balance sheets and (to
some extent) limiting potential sovereign-bank linkages.
The (preliminary) empirical evidence is thus supportive of the latest EAPP in that
it succeeded in lowering bond yields and pushing the investors out from the
sovereign debt market. This evidence is consistent with other studies, including Gagnon
et al. (2011), D'Amico et al. (2012), and McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014) looking at
other central banks’ Asset Purchases programmes. Gagnon et al. (2011), for instance,
studied the Fed’s 2008-09 QE and found that large-scale asset purchase (LSAP)
announcements reduced U.S. long-term yields. Similarly, Joyce et al. (2011) found that the
BoE’s QE program had bond yield effects quantitatively similar to those reported by Gagnon
et al. (2011) for the U.S.
As a part of this extended package, the ECB will buy investment-grade euro-
denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporates. This is very novel since ECB is
now entering the private sector financing market. Previous private asset
purchases have generally shown positive results, though mostly in the US. In the
first phase of LSAP 1, the Fed purchased mortgage-backed securities and Agency bonds.
LSAP 1 appears to have decreased MBS yields by 150 bps (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2010), and mortgage rates by nearly 50 bps (Hancock and Passmore, 2011).
This, however, happened in an environment when the spread over US Treasuries
was unusually high. While Portugal’s and Greece’s 2 and 10 year spreads are on
the rise (see Section 3.3), it is not the case for the whole euro area at the moment.
With the latest extension EAPP the ECB has increased the monthly asset purchases to €80
billion. This recent move can be viewed in two ways. On one hand, ECB is signalling its
solid commitment to fulfil its price stability mandate, and a greater tolerance for risk. On
the other hand, however, the recent extension may also unveil concerns that the ECB is
having a hard time in managing a stubbornly low inflation and growth, as well as facing
shortage of supply in the bond markets (this will be discussed in greater details in the next
section).
2.2. The signalling transmission channel
The previous empirical evidence on asset purchase programmes points to the prevalence of
the signalling channel, though the scarcity and duration channels occasionally played
important roles. In the case of the euro area, the latter two have been particularly strong
(Altavilla, Carboni and Motto, 2015).  Overall, however, IMF staff estimates based on the
US, UK and Japanese experiences, suggests that the signalling channel seems to have
had the largest macroeconomic effects. On average, IMF (2013) found that a decrease
in long-term yields coming through the signalling channel has an effect on GDP growth
approximately twice as large as the same shock coming through the portfolio rebalancing
channels. This result is consistent with theory, whereby shocks to long-term rates due to
“portfolio rebalancing” are expected to be more provisional and reversible, in part due to
the volatile market conditions on which this channel relies.1
In this respect, Draghi made clear that the ECB would be unwinding "unconventional"
measures in the (near) future. He also said that they do not anticipate “it will be necessary
to reduce rates further”, signalling that the -0.4 deposit rate could be the ECB’s very floor,
hence avoiding sending the signal that rates can go into negative territory indefinitely.
1 Stein (2012) provides another explanation: lower premia on riskier long-term bonds induced by portfolio
rebalancing might lead firms to buy back shorter-term debt with longer-term issuance.
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
PE 578.99510
Hence, yet again, despite the ECB’s EAPP further extension, the ECB’s action in non-
standard mode was based on a principle of separation between the interest rate policy and
recourse to exceptional measures (see Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016).
This latest extension of the EAPP has, nevertheless, attracted criticism, particularly as the
ECB was not prompt enough to distil the type of non-banks which are eligible for
purchases, or the composition of the additional €20bn bond purchases. Going forward, as
purchases will increase over time, monetary-fiscal policy interactions will be very relevant,
as we underlined in a previous note (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016), and echoing the
current debate. More recently, Draghi opened the possibility of “helicopter money” calling it
“a very interesting concept” (even if recognizing that it involves accounting and legal
“complexities, on the other hand”). All in all, the medium to long-term effects of
European QE may depend on the quality of market signalling by the ECB and the
extent to which markets will react to it going forward. The initial market reaction to
the extension of assets purchases has been a lot more liquidity flowing into the fixed
income segment. Data from Morningstar show that European investors returned to fixed
income funds from March, following a nine-month period of constant outflow. Data for
March show that around EUR 3 (11.6) billion flew in into the corporate bond (fixed income)
market (Suter, 2016). At the same time and following announcement that investment-
grade European corporate bonds would be purchased, the issuance of this category of
bonds increased by EUR 30.6 billion in the same month.2 However, not all bond issuers
were equally successful in drawing funds. While Shroders and Pioneer’s saw liquidity
pouring in into their high-yield funds, BlackRock and US-Dollar denominated funds lost EUR
1.8 billion and EUR 4.3 billion respectively only in 2016 (Suter, 2016). Also the equity
markets have gone up for two months since March, after having fallen for most of last year
(Melin, 2016). However, it is not clear whether this rapid influx of liquidity to those markets
is improving the market functioning, or it is simply used to engage in speculative short-
term gains. Only more data and a structured financial stability analysis will be able to
disentangle the two and answer this concern.
2 This influx has been the largest since the QE programme started in March 2015.
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3. ASSESSING QUANTITATIVE EASING
3.1. Inflation and expectations
As underlined in a previous note (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016), the ECB does not have a
mandate to support employment or growth, as, e.g. the Fed. Its primary objective is to
keep inflation below, but close to, 2 percent — a goal the ECB has missed since the start of
the EAPP. If we were to use inflation as “yardstick” for the EAPP’s success, the Program
felt short of its objectives: inflation has been running well below the ECB’s target for the
past three years (Cf. Figure 2, core inflation increased to 0.80 percent in May 2016 over
the same month in the previous year), although some of the slump reflects the fall in
energy costs.
The latest inflation expectations monitor from Allianz Global show that the slight increase in
expected inflation during the past month (May 2016) has mainly come from a recovery in
crude oil prices (Petersen, 2016). While this is good news for euro area, it brings into
question the successfulness of ECB QE in driving up prices.
Inflation expectations are indeed relevant going ahead since they give projections on the
future path of inflation. According to the ECB’s forecast, the central bank expects no
inflation this year (0.1 percent). But it expects the EAPP can help raise inflation to 1.3
percent next year and to 1.6 percent in 2018. These last figures revise down the ECB’s
previous more optimistic figure of bringing inflation at 1.8 percent already by 2017. Those
calculations depend, however, on future (further) rises in crude prices.
Figure 2: Euro area CPI headline and CPI core developments
(Annual % change)
Source: ECB Data Statistical Warehouse
Survey of Professional Forecasters’ expectations have remained flat, or even decreased at a
5 year horizon (Figure 3) and the aggregate uncertainty surrounding longer-term inflation
expectations, as measured by the standard deviation of the aggregated probability, has
overall increased (Figure 4). At the same time the probability of inflation at or above 2%
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has been trending downwards since 2013Q1, with the Asset Purchasing Program not being
able to invert this trend. From Figure 4 it is clear that only the 5-year ahead inflation
expectation comes somewhere close to (even if still significantly under) the 2 percent
target. What is not clear is whether those expectations have priced in a possibility of the
ECB continuing the EAPP 5 years ahead. If so, should the ECB decide to tamper off sooner,
there might be further downward pressure for medium-term expectation.
Figure 3: Survey of Professional
Forecasters expectations
Figure 4: Disagreement and
uncertainty regarding longer-term
inflation expectations
Source: ECB Data. Last observation 2016Q2 Source: ECB SPF 2016Q2 Report
According to SPF respondents, the main factor behind the strong downward revision and
low inflation forecast in 2015 was the sharp drop in oil prices observed since mid-2014.
This survey was taken shortly before European QE took place (Figure 5, top left panel).
During the first year of QE in 2015, the most likely outcome has shifted down one bin to
the 0.0 - 0.4% range, from the 0.5 - 0.9% range (see Figure 5, top-right panel). As
reported by the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters Report for 2016Q2, for the current
year, although the most likely outcome remained in the same bin (i.e. 1.0 - 1.4%), the
probability associated with lower outcomes has generally increased.
After Europe QE was implemented (see Figure 5, top-right panel), survey expectations
considered that the slack remaining in the euro area economy would have been removed
only gradually, with the ongoing adjustments in some euro area countries being reported
as some of the factors behind the very low inflationary pressure. The main factor cited as
being behind the downward revisions for the 2015 post-QE outlook compared with the
previous survey round (pre-QE) was the lower oil prices observed at the beginning of the
year. On the other hand, exchange rate developments and the expected effects of the EAPP
were cited as counteracting factors in the revisions. These factors, however, did not seem
to counteract the aggregate probability distribution for expected inflation in 2015 to further
towards lower outcomes. For the last two quarters of 2015 (Figure 5, bottom panels), there
was a relatively high probability of inflation remaining below 1.0% in 2016 (38-48% in
between the two quarters’ forecasts). Said that, the probability of negative inflation
remained moderate.
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Figure 5: Aggregated probability distribution of inflation expectations
Inflation Expectations in 2015
(Before March 2015 - 2015Q1 Report)
Inflation Expectations in 2015
(After March 2015 - 2015Q2 Report)
Inflation Expectations in 2016
(1st quarter of 2016 - 2016Q1 Report)
Inflation Expectations in 2016
(2nd quarter of 2016Q2 - 2016Q1 Report)
Source: ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters
In this respect, the empirical evidence would suggest that inflation tail risk are normally
reduced (the inflation skewness based on surveyed expectations decreases) as per the
effect of central bank purchases – if purchases are announced (see IMF, 2013).3 Evidence
for the ECB’s purchases on inflation expectations may be difficult to evaluate,
given the counteracting effects of oil prices and weak demand from emerging
market economies at the same time. Consistent with the ECB’s inflation forecasts’
figures, the Survey of Professional Forecasters last reported that the risks to the baseline
inflation outlook are perceived as relatively on the downside for 2017 and 2018 (not
reported here), with these downside risks stemming indeed primarily from external factors.
3 Of course, with the mitigating factor that surveys are not necessarily perfect measures of agents' beliefs.
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3.2. A weaker euro
The start of the European QE came just days following the announcement of a better-than-
expected round of US employment figures prompting rumours that the US Federal Reserve
was to raise interest rates shortly after. The expected diverging paths of the ECB and the
Fed have contributed keeping the euro weak against the dollar throughout 2015-16. In light
of the unexpectedly weak US job growth figures over the past few months, the Fed has
postponed the idea of raising interest rates, possibly to its next July or September
meetings. This has prevented the euro to depreciate further, and reach parity with the
dollar, with the exchange rate now standing at 1.14 (Figure 6).
Figure 6: EUR-USD Exchange rate
developments
Figure 7: Trade-weighted euro index
(NEER)
Source: ECB Data Statistical Warehouse Source: Petersen (2016)
The extent to which parity will be achieved will largely depend on Fed’s moves during the
coming months. The ECB clearly wishes for the euro to continue to weaken as it continues
with the EAPP, in the hope of spurring growth via external demand. However, its success
will crucially depend on several factors, including trade. While the EUR has weakened
even with respect to other currencies, since ECB engaged in EAPP, the EUR has
consistently appreciated with respect to the basket of its trade-weighted
currencies, as shown in Figure 7. The index is currently at the same point as it was in
early 2015, just before the QE. Hence, its success will crucially depend on whether it
manages to turn the trend on the NEER trade-weighted rate towards depreciation.
3.2. Growth
The euro area economy expanded 0.5 percent on quarter-to-quarter in the first three
months of 2016, lower than a preliminary estimate of 0.6 percent (Figure 8). This still
represents the fastest growth rate in a year (Trading Economics) as large economies such
as Germany, France and Italy accelerated while Greece and Latvia contracted.
As underlined previously (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016) QE will not work alone, as the
eurozone’s recovery will depend on much more than the ECB’s EAPP. Confidence is likely to
play a significant role. Contributing to a lower outlook may be the still high unemployment
figures and geo-political threats (e.g., Brexit). The ECB has recently revised down its
growth forecasts to 1.4% this year, 1.7 percent in 2016, and 1.8 percent in 2017. In
addition, the combination with fiscal stimulus (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016) is crucial as
monetary-fiscal interactions become more important over time.
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Figure 8: Euro area GDP growth rate
Source: Trading Economics based on Eurostat data
3.3. Lending
As discussed previously, the EAPP is supposed to push banks to sell their holdings of
government debt and take on more risk, either by focusing on other asset classes or
lending more to households and firms (the latter, under the additional stimulus of the
TLTRO).
There are signs that credit conditions are easing for the businesses and households in the
euro zone. In the euro area, loans to household increased 1.5 percent year-on-year in April
2016, slowing from a 1.6 percent rise in the previous couple of months, whereas credit to
non-financial corporations grew 1.2 percent, higher than a 1.1 percent rise in March. Total
annual credit growth in the euro area including governments accelerated to 3.3 percent
from 3.1 percent in the previous month: credit to governments went up to 10.4 percent,
0.3 percent higher than 10.1 percent in March and private sector credit growth also
increased at a faster rate of 1.2 percent from 1.1 percent (Cf. Figure 9; Trading
Economics).
However, a further look into the disaggregated figures from the ECB lending survey shows
a much more diverse picture. QE is not the main driver of the expansion in credit. Most
banks surveyed say that the extra liquidity they receive has basically no impact on their
decisions to grant (or not) loans. For firm loans, fewer banks now claim QE liquidity is
helping their lending than in the previous survey in October last year. Moreover, banks are
complaining that the EAPP is eroding their profits (see the discussion in our previous note,
Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016). Taken together, it is safe to conclude that the net easing
impact of bond purchases appears to be improving terms and conditions of loan granting
rather than credit standards themselves (see also Bloomberg, 2016).
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Figure 9: Loans to private sector (% change)
Source: Trading economics based on Eurostat data
Figure 10: Sovereign spreads
Source: Amundi Research
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In addition, there is a regional disparity in the lending figures. While banks in the core
countries are buying bonds from their own governments, the banks in the periphery (such
as Spain, Italy, Portugal) are engaging in carry-trade opportunities by buying bonds from
the core. Capital Economics noted that periphery banks have used some of the proceedings
allocated to them to buy sovereign bonds from core countries, thus reflecting a lack of
confidence in the performance of their own economies, and clearly reducing lending
opportunities for the local economy. The consequences from this can also be seen in
peripheral bond spreads in Figure 10. Both the 2-year and 10-year spreads have started to
rise again, particularly for Portugal and Greece, since March this year. Also the stock
markets of the core countries have seen a much sharper rise than in the peripheral
countries, shedding further doubt on the economic prospects of the periphery (Melin,
2016).
Thus, while bank lending is picking up in the euro area, ECB’s EAPP seems to have
limited impact on the lending-decisions. If anything, it is having an impact on the
terms and conditions of loans, not the quantity of credit. However, significant
regional disparities have been observed in lending. In particular, mainly banks
from the core seem to be (re)gaining confidence about national (sovereign and
credit) conditions.
3.4. Yields and the yield curve
One of the intended impacts of QE is to push down longer-term interest rates. As discussed
in Section 2.1 this is consistent with recent evidence of the EAPP. For instance, 80% of
German debt is trading at negative yields, with 19% below the new ECB’s threshold, and
borrowing costs for many euro area countries are already at their lowest.
Figure 11: Share of German bonds with
negative yields
Figure 12: Euro area yield curve
with key ECB dates
Source: Frederik Ducrozet Source: ECB Statistics
However, not only the German bonds are trading at negative yields, but many of the other
northern European and Swiss bonds (Figure 13). For most of the core countries, all bonds
up to 7 years are trading negatively. From Figure 14, it is clear that while core countries
have around 50 percent of their total outstanding debt (all maturities) traded in the
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negative territory (or even with yields lower than -0.4 percent), for periphery, most or all of
the debt trades at positive yields. Hence there is still a high spectrum for bringing those
yields down. Yet, ECB’s purchases may be constrained by capital keys.
Figure 13: Sovereign bonds trading at negative yields (in red)
Source: Allianz Global
Despite this picture, most analysts believe that this per se does not represent a problem in
terms of supply shortage even under the new extended purchase limits. The willingness to
issue new bonds at those negative yields is still high. The complication rather lies within the
existing bond holders, or ‘captive investors’. Concerns remain that they will not be willing
to sell their share of bond holdings to the ECB despite the negative yields (Petersen, 2016).
Even if the supply shortage is not an imminent problem for the ECB, it might become a
problem at a later date when the ECB’s universe of ‘acceptable’ bonds will shrink. At the
same time, on the demand side, more than 53 percent of total foreseen purchases of bonds
under the EAPP have been executed, but there is at least one year to go. Hence the
logistics of accessing bonds for ECB may become a supply, as well as a demand
problem, if the characteristics of it do not change. Nevertheless, this risk remains
limited since the ECB President has, on multiple occasions, showed his readiness to amend
the QE programme to fit the changing market environment.
Figure 14: Bond yields trading in negative territory out of the universe
of all bonds
Source: Allianz Global
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CONCLUSIONS
The recent move to expand ECB’s asset purchase programme (EAPP) adds the purchase
programme for public sector securities to the existing private sector asset purchase
programmes to address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation. It now consists
of a covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), asset-backed securities purchase
programme (ABSPP) and public sector purchase programme (PSPP). According to the latest
monetary policy decision, monthly purchases in public and private sector securities will
amount to €80 billion (updating the previous figure of €60 billion from March 2015 until
March 2016). They are intended to be carried out until the end of March 2017 and in any
case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is
consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium
term.
A new extension of the QE programme requires a new evaluation of its successfulness in
achieving its objectives. While we recognise that it is still too early to grant a full objective
evaluation of the ECB’s policies, we do provide some insights into the EAPP’s impact on the
different segments of the financial market and the real economy. The results are quite
mixed. While inflation expectations rose during the last month, they are still well below the
2 percent target. Moreover, most of the rise can be attributed to the recovery in crude oil
prices rather than the QE policy itself, and the Professional Forecasters’ outlook for the next
years is on the downside. Also bank lending has increased, including lending to SME’s.
However, following the bank lending survey executed by ECB, the direct effects of QE on
their bank-lending decisions has been estimated to be very limited. The impact on the
exchange rate and growth has been more clear and visible. More needs to be done if the
trend is not to revert. To conclude, there should be pressure for further fiscal stimulus in
the euro area, the ECB should monitor the markets for any potential shortage of supply risk
(particular in the core), and most importantly, push banks in the periphery to engage in
their local lending markets and buy their own country’s bonds instead of those from the
core - all in all - to ensure the ECB’s expected boost to the economy to be more even.
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